Thou
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with
all thy mind.
Every body knows, you therefore need only just be put in mind, that there
is such a thing, as having so great horror of one extreme, as to run insensibly
and of course into the contrary; and that a doctrine's having been a shelter for
enthusiasm, or made to serve the purposes of superstition, is no proof of the
falsity of it: truth or right being somewhat real in itself, and so not to be
judged of by its liableness to abuse, or by its supposed distance from, or
nearness to error. It may be sufficient to have mentioned this in general,
without taking notice of the particular extravagancies, which have been vented
under the pretence or endeavor of explaining the love of God; or how manifestly
we are got into the contrary extreme, under the notion of a reasonable religion;
so very reasonable as to have nothing to do with the heart and affections, if
these words signify any thing but the faculty by which we discern speculative
truth.
By the love of God, I would understand all those regards, all those
affections of mind, which are due immediately to him from such a creature as
man, and which rest in him as their end. As this does not include servile fear,
so neither will any other regards, how reasonable soever, which respect any
thing out of or besides the perfection of the divine nature, come into
consideration here. But all fear is not excluded, because his displeasure is
itself the natural proper object of fear. Reverence, ambition of his love and
approbation, delight in the hope or consciousness of it, come likewise into this
definition of the love of God; because he is the natural object of all those
affections or movements of mind, as really as he is the object of the affection,
which is in the strictest sense called love; and all of them equally rest in
him, as their end. And they may all be understood to be implied in these words
of our Saviour, without putting any force upon them; for he is speaking of the
love of God, and our neighbor, as containing the whole of piety and
virtue.
It
is plain, that the nature of man is so constituted, as to feel certain
affections upon the sight or contemplation of certain objects. Now the very
notion of affection implies resting in its objects as an end: And the particular
affection to good characters, reverence, and moral love of them, is natural to
all those who have any degree of real goodness in themselves. This will be
illustrated by the description of a perfect character in a creature; and by
considering the manner in which a good man, in, his presence, would be affected
towards such a character. He would or course feel the affections of love,
reverence, desire of his approbation, delight in the hope or consciousness of
it. And surely all this is applicable, and may be brought up to that Being, who
is infinitely more than an adequate object of all those affections; whom we are
commanded to "love with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our
mind." And of these regards towards Almighty God, some are more particularly
suitable to and becoming so imperfect a creature as man, in this mortal state we
are passing through: and some of them, and perhaps other exercises of the mind,
will be the employment and happiness of good men in a state of
perfection.
This
is a general view of what the following discourse will contain. And it is
manifest the subject is a real one: there is nothing in it enthusiastical or
unreasonable. And if it be indeed at all a subject, it is one of the utmost
importance.
As
mankind have a faculty by which they discern speculative truth, so we have
various affections towards external objects. Understanding and temper, reason
and affection, are as distinct ideas as reason and hunger; and one would think,
could no more be confounded. It is by reason that we get the ideas of several
objects of our affections: but in these cases reason and affection are no more
the same, than sight of a particular object, and the pleasure or uneasiness
consequent thereupon, are the same. Now, as reason tends to and rests in the
discernment of truth, the object of it; so the very nature of affection consists
in tending towards, and resting in, its objects as an end. We do indeed often,
in common language, say, that things are loved, desired, esteemed, not for
themselves, but for somewhat further, somewhat out of and beyond them: yet, in
these cases, whoever will attend, will see; that these things are not in reality
the objects of the affections, i. e. are not loved, desired, esteemed,
but the somewhat further and beyond them. If we have no affections which rest in
what are called their objects, then what is called affection, love, desire,
hope, in human nature, is only an uneasiness in being at rest; an unquiet
disposition to action, progress, pursuit, without end or meaning. But if there
be any such thing as delight in the company of one person, rather than of
another; whether in the way of friendship, or mirth and entertainment, it is all
one, if it be without respect to fortune, honor, or increasing our stores of
knowledge, or any thing beyond the present time; here is an instance of an
affection absolutely resting in its object as its end, and being gratified, in
the same way as the appetite of hunger is satisfied with food. Yet nothing is
more common than to hear it asked, What advantage a man hath in such a course,
suppose of study, particular friendships, or in any other? nothing, I say, is
more common than to hear such a question put in a way which supposes no gain,
advantage, or interest, but as a means to somewhat further: and if so, then
there is no such thing at all as real interest, gain, or advantage. This is the
same absurdity with respect to life, as an infinite series of effects without a
cause is in speculation. The gain, advantage, or interest, consists in the
delight itself, arising from such a faculty's having its object: neither is
there any such thing as happiness or enjoyment, but what arises from hence. The
pleasures of hope and of reflection are not exceptions: the former being only
this happiness anticipated; the latter, the same happiness enjoyed over again
after its time. And even the general expectation of future happiness can afford
satisfaction, only as it is a present object to the principle of
self-love.
It
was doubtless intended, that life should be very much a pursuit to the gross of
mankind. But this is carried so much farther than is reasonable, that what gives
immediate satisfaction, i. e. our present interest, is scarce considered
as our interest at all. It is inventions which have only a remote tendency
towards enjoyment, perhaps but a remote tendency towards gaining the means only
of enjoyment, which are chiefly spoken of as useful to the world. And though
this way of thinking were just, with respect to the imperfect state we are now
in, where we know so little of satisfaction without satiety; yet it must be
guarded against, when we are considering the happiness of a state of perfection;
which happiness being enjoyment and not hope, must necessarily consist in this,
that our affections have their objects, and rest in those objects as an end,
i. e. be satisfied with them. This will further appear in the sequel of
this discourse.
Of
the several affections, or inward sensations, which particular objects excite in
man, there are some, the having of which implies the love of them, when they are
reflected upon (1).
This cannot be said of all our affections, principles, and motives of action. It
were ridiculous to assert, that a man, upon reflection, hath the same kind of
approbation of the appetite of hunger, or the passion of fear, as he hath of
good will to his fellow creatures. To be a just, a good, a righteous man,
plainly carries with it a peculiar affection to, or love of justice, goodness,
righteousness when these principles are the objects of contemplation. Now if a
man approves of, or hath, an affection to any principle, in and for itself;
incidental things allowed for, it will be the same whether he views it in his
own mind or in another; in himself; or in his neighbor. This is the account of
our approbation of, our moral love and affection to good characters; which
cannot but be in those who can have any degrees of real goodness in themselves,
and who discern and take notice of the same principle in
others.
From
observation of what passes within ourselves, our, own actions, and the behaviour
of others, the mind may carry on its reflections as far as it pleases; much
beyond what we experience in ourselves, or discern in our fellow creatures. It
may go on, and consider goodness as become an uniform continued principle of
action, as conducted by reason, and forming a temper and character absolutely
good and perfect, which is in a higher sense excellent, and proportionably the
object of love and approbation.
Let
us then suppose a creature perfect according to his created nature: let his form
be human, and his capacities no more than equal to those of the chief of men:
goodness shall be his proper character; with wisdom to direct it, and power,
within some certain determined sphere of action, to exert it: but goodness must
be the simple actuating principle within him; this being the moral quality which
is amiable, or the immediate object of love, as distinct from other affections
of approbation. Here then is a finite object for our mind to tend towards, it to
exercise itself upon: a creature perfect according to
his
capacity, fixed, steady, equally unmoved by weak pity, or more weak fury and
resentment; forming the justest scheme of conduct; going on undisturbed in the
execution of it, through the several methods of severity and reward, towards his
end, namely, the general happiness of all with whom be hath to do, as in itself
right and valuable. This character, though uniform in itself, in its principle,
yet exerting itself in different ways, or considered in different views, may by
its appearing variety move different affections. Thus, the severity of justice
would not affect us in the same way, as an act of mercy: the adventitious
qualities of wisdom and power may be considered in themselves; and even the
strength of mind, which this immoveable goodness supposes, may likewise be
viewed as an object of contemplation, distinct from the goodness itself.
Superior excellence of any kind, as well as superior wisdom and power, is the
object of awe and reverence to all creatures, whatever their moral character be:
but so far as creatures of the lowest rank were good, so far the view of this
character, as simply good, most appear amiable to them, be the object of, or
beget love. Further, suppose we were conscious, that this superior person so far
approved of us, that we had nothing servilely to fear from him; that he was
really our friend, and kind and good to us in particular, as he had occasionally
intercourse with us: we must be other creatures than we are, or we could not but
feel the same kind of satisfaction and enjoyment (whatever would be the degree
of it,) from this higher acquaintance and friendship, as we feel from common
ones; the intercourse being real, and the persons equally present, in both
cases. We should have a more ardent desire to be approved by his better
judgment, and a satisfaction, in that approbation, of the same sort with what
would be felt in respect to common persons, or be wrought in us by their
presence.
Let
us now raise the character, and suppose this creature, for we are still going on
with the supposition of a creature, our proper guardian and governor; that we
were in a progress of being towards somewhat further; and that his scheme of
government was too vast for our capacities to comprehend; remembering still that
he is perfectly good, and our friend as well as our governor. Wisdom, power,
goodness, accidentally viewed any where, would inspire reverence, awe, love: and
as these affections would be raised in higher or lower degrees, in proportion as
we had occasionally more or less intercourse with the creature endued with those
qualities, so this further consideration and knowledge that he was our proper
guardian and governor, would much more bring these objects and qualities home to
ourselves; teach us they had a greater respect to us in particular, that we had
a higher interest in that wisdom and power and goodness. We should, with joy,
gratitude, reverence, love, trust, and dependance, appropriate the character, as
what we had a right in, and make our boast in such our relation to it. And the
conclusion of the whole would be, that we should refer ourselves implicitly to
him, and cast ourselves entirely upon him. As the whole attention of life should
be to obey his commands, so the highest enjoyment of it must arise from the
contemplation of his character, and our relation to it, from a consciousness of
his favor and approbation, and from the exercise of those affections towards
him, which could not but be raised from his presence. A being who hath these
attributes, who stands in this relation, and is thus sensibly present to the
mind, must necessarily be the object of these affections: there is as real a
correspondence between them; as between the lowest appetite of sense and its
object.
That
this Being is not a creature, but the Almighty God; that he is of infinite power
and wisdom and goodness, does not render him less the object of reverence and
love, than he would be if he had those attributes only in a limited degree. The
Being who made us, and upon whom we entirely depend, is the object of some
regards. He hath given us certain affections of mind, which correspond to
wisdom, power, goodness; i. e. which are raised upon view of those
qualities. If then he be really wise, powerful, good, he is the natural object
of those affections, which he ,hath endued us with, and which correspond to
those attributes. That he is infinite in power, perfect in wisdom and goodness,
makes no alteration, but only that he is the object of those affections raised
to the highest pitch. He is not indeed to be discerned by any of our senses: "I.
go forward, but he is not there; and backward, but I cannot perceive him: on the
left hand where he doth work, but I cannot behold him: he hideth himself on the
right hand that I cannot see him. Oh that I knew where I might find him! that I
might come even to his seat! (2)" But is he then afar off? Does he not
fill heaven and earth with his presence? The presence of our fellow creatures
affects our senses, and our senses give us the knowledge of their presence;
which hath different kinds of influence upon us - love, joy, sorrow, restraint,
encouragement, reverence. However, this influence is not immediately from our
senses, but from that knowledge. Thus, suppose a person neither to see nor hear
another, not to know by any of his senses, but yet certainly to know, that
another was with him; this knowledge might, and in many cases would, have one or
more of the effects before mentioned. It is therefore not only reasonable, but
also natural, to be affected with a presence, though it be not the object of our
senses: whether it be, or be not, is merely an accidental circumstance, which
needs not come into consideration: it is the certainty that he is with us, and
we with him, which hath the influence. We consider persons then as present, not
only when they are within reach of our senses, but also when we are assured by
any other means, that they are within such a nearness; nay, if they are not, we
can recall them to our mind, and be moved towards them as present: and must he,
who is so much more intimately with us, that "in him we live, and move, and have
our being," be thought too distant to be the object of our affections? We own and feel the force of amiable and
worthy qualities in our fellow creatures; and can we be insensible to the
contemplation of perfect goodness? Do we reverence the shadows of greatness here
below; are we solicitous about honor, and esteem, and the opinion of the world;
and shall we not feel the same with respect to him, whose are wisdom and power
in their original, who "is the God of judgment, by whom actions are
weighed?" Thus love, reverence,
desire of esteem, every faculty, every affection, tends towards, and is employed
about its respective object in common cases: and must the exercise of them be
suspended with regard to him alone, who is an object, an infinitely more than
adequate object, to our most exalted faculties; him, "of whom, and through whom,
and to whom are all things?"
As
we cannot remove from this earth, or change our general business on it, so
neither can we alter our real nature. Therefore no exercise of the mind can be
recommended, but only the exercise of those faculties you are conscious of.
Religion does not demand new affections, but only claims the direction of those
you already have, those affections you daily feel; though unhappily confined to
objects, not altogether unsuitable, but altogether unequal to them. We only
represent to you the higher, the adequate objects of those very faculties and
affections. Let the man of ambition go on still to consider disgrace as the
greatest evil; honor as his chief good. But disgrace, in whose estimation?
Honor, in whose judgment? This is the only question. If shame, and delight in
esteem, be spoken of as real, as any settled ground of pain or pleasure, both
these must be in proportion to the supposed wisdom and worth of him by whom we
are contemned or esteemed. Must it then be thought enthusiastical to speak of a
sensibility of this sort, which shall have respect to an unerring judgment, to
infinite wisdom; when we are assured this unerring judgment, this infinite
wisdom, does observe upon our actions?
It
is the same with respect to the love of God in the strictest and most confined
sense. We only offer and represent the highest object of an affection supposed
already in your mind. Some degree of goodness must be previously supposed: this
always implies the love of itself, an affection to goodness: the highest, the
adequate object of this affection, is perfect goodness? which, therefore, we are
to "love with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our strength."
"Must we then, forgetting our own interest, as it were go out of ourselves, and
love God for his own sake ?" No more forget your own interest, no more go out of
yourselves, than when you prefer one place, one prospect, the conversation of
one man to that of another. Does not every affection
necessarily
imply,
that the object of it be itself loved? If it be not, it is not the object of the
affection. You may and ought, if you can, but it is a great mistake to think you
can, love, or fear, or hate any thing, from consideration that such love, or
fear, or hatred, may be a means of obtaining good or avoiding evil. But the
question, whether we ought to love God for his sake or for our own, being a mere
mistake in language; the real question, which this is mistaken for, will, I
suppose, be answered by observing, that the goodness of God already exercised
towards us, our present dependance upon him, and our expectation of future
benefits, ought, and have a natural tendency, to beget in us the affection of
gratitude, and greater love towards him, than the same goodness exercised
towards others: were it only for this reason, that every affection is moved in
proportion to the sense we have of the object of it; and we cannot but have a
more lively sense of goodness, when exercised towards ourselves, than when
exercised towards others. I added expectation of future benefits, because the
ground of that expectation is present goodness.
Thus,
Almighty God is the natural object of the several affections, love, reverence,
fear, desire of approbation. For though he is simply One, yet we cannot but
consider him in partial and different views. He is in himself one uniform Being,
and for ever the same, without "variableness or shadow of turning:" but his
infinite greatness, his goodness, his wisdom, are
different
objects
to our mind. To which is to be added, that from the changes in our own
characters, together with his unchangeableness, we cannot but consider ourselves
as more or less the objects of his approbation, and really be so. For if he
approves what is good, he cannot, merely from the unchangeableness of his
nature, approve what is evil. Hence must arise more various movements of mind,
more different kinds of affections. And this greater variety also is just and
reasonable in such creatures as we are, though it respects a Being, simply one,
good, and perfect. As some of these affections are most particularly suitable to
so imperfect a creature as man, in this mortal state we are passing through; so
there may be other exercises of mind, or some of these in higher degrees, our
employment and happiness in a state of perfection.
1
St Austin observes, Amor ipse ordinate amandus est, quo bene amatur quod
amandum est, ut sit in nobis virtus qua vivitur bene. i. e. The affection which we rightly
have for what is lovely, must ordinate justly, in due manner, and proportion,
become the object of a new affection, or be itself beloved, in order to our
being endued with that virtue which is the principle of a good life. Civ. Doi.
I. 15. c. 22.
2 Job
23.