For
when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in
the law, these having not the law, are a law unto themselves.
As
speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so likewise moral
obligations may be shown by different methods. If the real nature of any
creature leads him, and is adapted to such and such purposes only, or more than
to any other; this is a reason to believe the Author of that nature intended it
for those purposes. Thus there is no doubt the eye was intended for us to see
with. And the more complex any constitution is, and the greater variety of parts
there are which thus tend to some one end, the stronger is the proof that such
end was designed. However, when the inward frame of man is considered as any
guide in morals, the utmost caution must be used that none make peculiarities in
their own temper, or any thing which is the effect of particular customs, though
observable in several, the standard of what is common to the species; and, above
all, that the highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that to which belongs
the adjustment and correction of all other inward movements and affections:
which principle will of course have some influence, but which, being in nature supreme, as
shall now be shown, ought to preside over and govern all the rest. The
difficulty of rightly observing the two former cautions the appearance there is
of some small diversity amongst mankind with respect to this faculty, with
respect to their natural sense of moral good and evil; and the attention..
necessary to survey with any exactness what passes within have occasioned that
it is not so much agreed what is the standard of the internal nature of man, as
of his external form. Neither is this last exactly settled. Yet we understand
one another when we speak of the shape of a human body; so likewise we do when
we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far soever the standard is from
being exact or precisely fixed. There is, therefore, ground for an attempt of
showing men to themselves, of showing them what course of life and behaviour
their real nature points out and would lead them to. Now, obligations of virtue
shown, and motives to the practice of it enforced, from a review of the nature
of man, are to be considered as an appeal to each particular person's heart and
natural conscience; as the external senses are appealed to for the proof of
things cognizable by them. Since, then, our inward feelings, and the perceptions
we receive, from our external senses, are equally real; to argue from the former
to life and conduct, is as little liable to exception, as to argue from the
latter to absolute speculative truth. A man can as little doubt whether his eyes
were given him to see with, as he can doubt of the truth of the science of
optics, deduced from occular experiments. And allowing the inward
feeling, shame; a man can as little doubt whether it was given him to prevent
his doing shameful actions, as he can doubt whether his eyes were given him to
guide his steps. And as to these inward feelings themselves; that they are real;
that man has in his nature passions and affections, can no more be questioned,
than that he has external senses. Neither can the former be wholly mistaken,
though to a certain degree liable to greater mistakes than the latter.
There
can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts, several principles in
the heart of man, carry him to society, and to contribute to the happiness of
it, in a sense and a manner in which no inward principle leads him to evil.
These principles, propensions, or instincts, which lead him to do good, are
approved of by a certain faculty within, quite distinct from these propensions
themselves. All this hath been fully made out in the foregoing discourse.
But
it may be said, "What is all this, though true, to the purpose of virtue and
religion? these require, not only that we do good to others when we are led this
way, by benevolence or reflection happening to be stronger than other
principles, passions, or appetities; but likewise that the whole
character be formed upon thought and reflection; that every action be directed
by some determinate rule, some other rule than the strength and prevalency of
any principle or passion. What sign
is there in our nature (for the inquiry is only about what is collected from
thence) that this was intended by its Author? or how does so various and fickle
a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? It may indeed be absurd and unnatural
for men to act without any reflection; nay without regard to that particular
kind of reflection which you call conscience; because this does belong to our
nature. For, as there never was a
man but who approved one place, prospect, building, before another; so it does
not appear that there ever was a man who would not have approved an action of
humanity rather than of cruelty; interest and passion being quite out of the
case. But interest and passion do come in, and are often too strong for, and
prevail over reflection and conscience. Now, as brutes have various instincts,
by which they are carried on to the end the Author of their nature intended them
for; is not man in the same condition, with this difference only, that to his
instincts (i. e. appetites and passions) is added the principle of
reflection or conscience? And as brutes act agreeably to their nature, in
following that principle or particular instinct which for the present is
strongest in them; does not man likewise act agreeably to his nature, or obey
the law of his creation, by following that principle, be it passion or
conscience, which for the present happens to be strongest in him? Thus,
different men are by their particular nature hurried on to pursue honor, or
riches, or pleasure. There are also persons whose temper leads them in an
uncommon degree to kindness, compassion, doing good to their fellow creatures;
as there are others who are given to suspend their judgment, to weigh and
consider things, and to act upon thought and reflection. Let everyone then
quietly follow his nature; as passion, reflection, appetite, the several parts
of it, happen to the strongest; but let not the man of virtue take upon him to
blame the ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute; since these, equally with him,
obey and follow their nature. Thus, as in some cases, we follow our nature in
doing the works contained in the law, so in other cases we follow nature
in doing contrary."
Now,
all this licentious talk entirely goes upon a supposition, that men follow their
nature in the same sense, in violating the known rules of justice and honesty
for the sake of a present gratification, as they do in following those rules
when they have no temptation to the contrary. And if this were true, that could
not be so which St Paul asserts, that men are "by nature a law to themselves."
If by following nature were meant only acting as we please, it would indeed be
ridiculous to speak of nature as any guide in morals: nay, the very mention of
deviating from nature would be absurd; and the mention of following it, when
spoken by way of distinction, would absolutely have no meaning. For, did ever anyone act otherwise than
as he pleased? And yet the ancients speak of deviating from nature, as vice: and
of following nature so much as a distinction, that, according to them, the
perfection of virtue consists therein. So that language itself should teach
people another sense to the words following nature, than barely acting as
we please. Let it however be observed, that though the words human nature
are to be explained, yet the real question of this discourse is not
concerning the meaning of words, any otherwise than as the explanation of them
may be needful to make out and explain the assertion, that every man if
naturally a law to himself; that everyone may find within himself the
role of right, and obligations to follow it. This St Paul affirms in the
words of the text, and this the foregoing objection really denies, by seeming to
allow it. And the objection will be fully answered, and the text before us
explained, by observing, that nature is considered in different views,
and the word used in different senses; and by showing in what view it is
considered, and in what sense the word is used, when intended to express and
signify that which is the guide of life, that by which men are a law to
themselves. I say, the explanation of the term will be sufficient, because from
thence it will appear, that in some senses of the word nature cannot be,
but that in another sense it manifestly is, a law to us.
I.
By nature is often meant no more than
some principle in man, without regard either to the kind or degree of it. Thus,
the passion of anger, and the affection of parents to their children, would be
called equally natural. And
as the same person hath often contrary principles, which at the same time draw
contrary ways, he may by the same action both follow and contradict his nature
in this sense of the word; he may follow one passion, and contradict
another.
II.
Nature is frequently spoken of as consisting in those passions which are
strongest, and most influence the actions; which being vicious ones, mankind is
in this sense naturally vicious, or vicious by nature. Thus St Paul says of the
Gentiles, who were dead in trespasses and sins, and walked according to the
spirit of diaobedience, that they were by nature the children of
Wrath (1).
They
could be no otherwise children of wrath by nature, than they were vicious by
nature.
Here
then are two different senses of the word nature, in neither of which men
can at all be said to be a law to themselves. They are mentioned only to be
excluded; to prevent their being confounded, as the latter is in the objection,
with another sense of it, which is now to be inquired after and
explained.
III.
The apostle asserts, that the Gentiles do by nature the things contained in
the law. Nature is indeed here put by way of distinction from revelation,
but yet it is not a mere negative. He intends to express more than that by which
they did not, that by which they did the works of the law; namely,
by nature. It is plain the meaning of the word is not the same in this
passage as in the former, where it is spoken of as evil; for in this latter it
is spoken of as good; as that by which they acted, or might have acted
virtuously. What that is in man by which he is naturally a law to
himself; is explained in the following words : Which shows the work of
the law, written in their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and
their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another. If there
be a distinction to be made between the works written in their hearts,
and the witness of conscience; by the former must be meant, the natural
disposition to kindness and compassion, to do what is of good report, to which
this apostle often refers; that part of the nature of man, treated of in the
foregoing discourse, which, with very little reflection and of course, leads him
to society, and by means of which he naturally acts a just and good part in it,
unless other passions or interest lead him astray. Yet since other passions, and
regards to private interest, which lead us (though indirectly, yet they lead us)
astray, are themselves in a degree equally natural, and often most prevalent;
and since we have no method or seeing the particular degrees in which one or the
other is placed in us by nature, it is plain the former, considered merely as
natural, good and right as they are, can no more be a law to us than the latter.
But there is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man which
distinguishes between the internal principles of his heart, as well as his
external actions; which passes judgment upon himself and them; pronounces
determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be
in themselves evil, wrong, unjust: which, without being consulted, without being
advised with, magisterially exerts itself, and approves or condemns him, the
doer of them, accordingly; and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and
always of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence,
which shall hereafter second and affirm its own. But this part of the office of
conscience is beyond my present design explicitly to consider. It is by this
faculty, natural to man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself.
By this faculty, I say, not to be considered merely as a principle in his heart,
which is to have some influence as well as others; but considered as a faculty,
in kind and in nature, supreme over all others, and which bears its own
authority of being so.
This
prerogative, this natural supremacy, of the faculty which surveys,
approves, or disapproves the several affections of our mind, and actions of our
lives, being that by which men are a law to themselves, their conformity
or disobedience to which law of our nature renders their actions, in the highest
and most proper sense, natural or unnatural; it is fit it be further explained
to you: and I hope it will be so, if you will attend to the following
reflections.
Man
may act according to that principle or inclination which for the present happens
to be strongest, and yet act in a way disproportionate to, and violate his real
proper nature. Suppose a brute creature by any bait to be allured into a snare,
by which he is destroyed: he plainly followed the bent of his nature, leading
him to gratify his appetite. There is an entire correspondence between his whole
nature and such an action: such action therefore is natural. But suppose a man,
foreseeing the same danger of certain ruin, should rush into it for the sake of
a present gratification; he in this instance would follow his strongest desire,
as did the brute creature. But there would be as manifest a disproportion
between the nature of a man and such an action, as between the meanest work of
art and the skill of the greatest master in that art; which disproportion
arises, not from considering the action singly in itself; or in its
consequences, but from comparison of it with the nature of the agent. And since such an action is utterly
disproportionate to the nature of man, it is in the strictest and most proper
sense unnatural; this word expressing that disproportion. Therefore, instead of
the words disproportionate to his nature, the word unnatural may
now be put; this being more familiar to us: but let it be observed, that it
stands for the same thing precisely.
Now,
what is it which renders such a rash action unnatural? Is it that he went
against the principle of reasonable and cool self-love, considered merely
as a part of his nature? No: For if he had acted the contrary way, he would
equally have gone against a principle, or towards, part of his nature, namely,
passion or appetite. But, to deny a
present appetite, from foresight that the gratification of it would end in
immediate ruin or extreme misery, is by no means an unnatural action. Whereas,
to contradict or go against cool self-love, for the sake of such gratification,
is so in the instance before us. Such an action then being unnatural, and its
being so not arising from a man's going against a principle or desire barely,
nor in going against that principle or desire which happens for the present to
be strongest; it necessarily follows, that there must be some other difference,
or distinction, to be made between these two principles, passion and cool
self-love, than what I have yet taken notice of. And this difference, not being a
difference in strength or degree, I call a difference in nature and in
kind. And since, in the instance still before us, if passion prevails
over self-love, the consequent action is unnatural; but if self-love prevails
over passion, the action is natural; it is manifest that self-love is in human
nature a superior principle to passion. This may be contradicted without
violating that nature, but the former cannot. So that, if we will act
conformably to the economy of man's nature, reasonable self-love must govern.
Thus, without particular consideration of conscience, we may have a clear
conception of the superior nature of one inward principle to another; and
see that there really is this natural superiority, quite distinct from degrees
of strength and prevalency.
Let
us now take a view of the nature of man, as consisting partly of various
appetites, passions, affections, and partly of the principle of reflection or
conscience; leaving quite out all consideration of the different degrees of
strength, in which either of them prevail; and it will further appear, that
there is this natural superiority of one inward principle to another, or that it
is even part of the idea of reflection or conscience.
Passion
or appetite implies a direct simple tendency towards such and such objects,
without distinction of the means by which they are to be obtained. Consequently,
it will often happen there will be a desire of particular objects, in cases
where they cannot be obtained without manifest injury to others. Reflection, or
conscience comes in, and disapproves the pursuit of them in these circumstances;
but the desire remains. Which is to be obeyed, appetite or reflection? Cannot
this question be answered from the economy and constitution of human nature
merely, without saying which is strongest? or need this at all come into
consideration? Would not the question be intelligibly and fully answered
by saying, that the principle of reflection or conscience being compared with
the various appetites, passions, and affections in men the former is manifestly
superior and chief, without regard to strength? And how often soever the latter
happens to prevail, it is mere usurpation. The former remains in nature
and in kind its supenor; and every instance of such prevalence of the latter, is
an instance of breaking in upon, and violation of the constitution of man.
All
this is no more than the distinction which every body is acquainted with,
between mere power and authority: only, instead of being intended to express the
difference between what is possible, and what is lawful in civil government,
here it has been shown applicable to the several principles in the mind of man.
Thus, that principle by which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our
own heart, temper, and actions, is not only to be considered as what is in its
turn to have some influence; which may be said of every passion, of the lowest
appetites: but likewise as being superior; as from its very nature manifestly
claiming superiority over all others; insomuch that you cannot form a notion of
this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction,
superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty
itself: and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of
man, belongs to it. Had it strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has
manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world.
This
gives us a further view of the nature of man; shows us what course of life we
were made for; not only that our real nature leads us to be influenced in some
degree by reflection and conscience, but likewise in what degree we are to be
influenced by it, if we will fall in with, and act agreeably to the constitution
of our nature: that this faculty was placed within to be our proper governor; to
direct and regulate all under principles, passions, and motives of action. This
is its right and office: thus sacred is its authority. And how often soever men
violate and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which
they cannot otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot
otherwise gratify; this makes no alteration as to the natural right, and office
of conscience.
Let
us now turn the whole matter another way, and suppose there was.no such thing at
all as this supremacy of conscience; that there was no distinction to be made
between one inward principle and another, but only that of strength; and see
what would be the consequence.
Consider
then what is the latitude and compass of the actions of man with regard to
himself, his fellow creatures, and the Supreme Being? What are their bounds,
besides that of our natural power? With respect to the two first, they are
plainly no other than these: no man seeks misery as such for himself; and no one
provoked does mischief to another for its own sake. For in every degree within
these bounds, mankind knowingly, from passion or wantonness, bring ruin and
misery upon themselves and others: and impiety and profaneness, I mean, what
every one would call so who believes the being of God, have absolutely no bounds
at all. Men blaspheme the Author of nature, formally, and in words renounce
their allegiance to their Creator.
Put an instance then with respect to any one of these three. Though we
should suppose profane swearing, and in general that kind of impiety now
mentioned, to mean nothing, yet it implies wanton disregard and irreverence
towards an infinite Being, our Creator; and is this as suitable to the nature of
man, as reverence and dutiful submission of heart towards that Almighty Being?
Or suppose a man guilty of parricide, with all the circumstances of cruelty
which such an action can admit of: this action is done in consequence of its
principle being for the present strongest: and if there be no difference between
inward principles, but only that of strength; the strength being given, you have
the whole nature of the man given, so far as it relates to this matter. The
action plainly corresponds to the principle, the principle being in that degree
of strength it was: it therefore corresponds to the whole nature of the man.
Upon comparing the action and the whole nature, there arises no disproportion,
there appears no unsuitableness between them. Thus the murder of a father
and the nature of man correspond to each other, as the same nature and an act of
filial duty. If there be no difference between inward principles, but only that
of strength, we can make no distinction between these two actions, considered as
the actions of such a creature, but in our coolest hours must approve or
disapprove them equally: than which nothing can be reduced to a greater
absurdity.
1 Ephes.
ii. 3