For
as we have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office;
so we being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of
another.
The
epistles of the New Testament have all of them a particular reference to the
condition and usages of the Christian world at the time they were written.
Therefore, as they cannot be thoroughly understood, unless that condition and
those usages are known and attended to; so, further, though they be known, yet,
if they be discontinued or changed, exhortations, precepts, and illustrations of
things, which refer to such circumstances now ceased or altered, cannot at this
time be urged in that manner, and with that force, which they were to the
primitive Christians. Thus, the text now before us, in its first intent and
design, relates to the decent management of those extraordinary gifts which were
then in the church, (1)
but which are now totally ceased. And even as the allusion, that "we are one
body in Christ," though what the apostle here intends is equally true of
Christians in all circumstances; and the consideration of it is plainly still an
additional motive, over and above moral considerations, to the discharge of the
several duties and offices of a Christian; yet it is manifest this allusion must
have appeared with much greater force to those, who, by the many difficulties
they went through for the sake of their religion, were led to keep always in
view the relation they stood in to their Saviour, who had undergone, the same;
to those who, from the idolatries of all around them, and their ill treatment,
were taught to consider is themselves as not of the world, in which they lived,
but as a distinct society of themselves; with laws, and ends, and principles of
life and action, quite contrary to those which the world professed themselves at
that time influenced by. Hence the
relation of a Christian was by them considered as nearer than that of affinity
and blood; and they almost literally esteemed themselves as members one of
another.
It
cannot indeed possibly be denied, that our being God's creatures, and virtue
being the natural law we are born under, and the whole constitution of man being
plainly adapted to it, are prior obligations to piety and to virtue, than the
consideration that God sent his Son into the world to save it, and the motives
which arise from the peculiar relation of Christians, as members one of another,
under Christ our head. However, though all this be allowed, as it expressly is
by the inspired writers, yet it is manifest, that Christians, at the time of the
Revelation, and immediately after, could. not but insist mostly upon
considerations of this latter kind.
These
observations show the original particular reference of the text; and the
peculiar force with which the thing intended by the allusion in it, must have
been felt by the primitive Christian world. They likewise afford a reason for
treating it at this time in a more general way.
The
relation which the several parts or members of the natural body have to each
other, and to the whole body, is here compared to the relation which each
particular person in society has to other particular persons, and to the whole
society; and the latter is intended to be illustrated by the former. And if
there be a likeness between these two relations, the consequence is obvious:
that the latter shows us we were intended to do good to others, as the former
shows us, that the several members of the natural body were intended to be
instruments of good to each other, and to the whole body. But as there is scarce
any ground for a comparison between society and the mere material body, this
without the mind being a dead unactive thing; much less can the comparison be
carried to any length. And since the apostle speaks of the several members as
having distinct offices, which implies the mind, it cannot be thought an
unallowable liberty, instead of the body and its members, to substitute the
whole nature of man, and all the variety of internal principles which belong to
it. And then the comparison will be between. the nature of man as respecting
self, and tending to private good, his own preservation and happiness; and the
nature of man as having respect to society, and tending to promote public good,
the happiness of that society. These ends do indeed perfectly arise from
coincide; and to aim, at public and private good are so far from being
inconsistent, that they mutually promote each other; yet, in the following
discourse, they must be considered as entirely distinct; otherwise the nature of
man, as tending to one, or as tending to the other, cannot be compared. There
can no comparison be made, without considering the things compared as distinct
and different.
From
this review and comparison. of the nature of man as respecting self, as
respecting society, it will plainly appear, that there are as real and the
same kind of indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to
do good to our fellow creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our
own life, and health, and private good; and that the same objections lie against
one of these assertions as against the other.
For,
First,
There is a natural principle of benevolence (2)
in man, which is in some degree to society, what self-love is to
the individual. And if there be in mankind any disposition to friendship;
if there be any such thing as compassion, for compassion is momentary love; if
there be any such things as the paternal of filial affections; if there be any
affection in human nature, the object and end of which is the good of another;
this is itself benevolence, or the love of another. Be it even so short, be it in ever so
low a degree, or ever so unhappily confined; it proves the assertion, and points
out what we were designed for, as really as though it were in a higher degree
and more extensive. I must however
remind you, that though benevolence and self-love are different; though the
former tends most directly to public good, and the latter private; yet there are
so perfectly coincident, that the greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend:
upon our having benevolence in a due degree; and that self-love is one chief
security of our right behaviour towards society. It may be added, that their
mutual coinciding, so that we can scarce promote one without the other, is
equally a proof that we were made for both.
Secondly, This will further appear from observing, that the
several passions and affections, which are distinct
(3)
both from benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute and lead us to
public good as really as to private. It might be thought too minute and
particular, and would carry us too great a length, to distinguish between, and
compare together the several passions or appetites, distinct from benevolence,
whose primary use and intention is the security and good of society; and the
passions distinct from self-love, whose primary intention and design is the
security and good of the individual.(4) It is enough to the present
argument, that desire of esteem from others, contempt and esteem of them, love
of society as distinct from affection to the good of it, indignation against
successful vice, that these are public affections or passions, have an immediate
respect to others, naturally lead us to regulate our behaviour in such a manner
as will be of service to our fellow creatures. If any or all of these may be
considered likewise as private affections, as tending to private good, this does
not hinder them from being public affections too, or destroy the good influence
of them upon society, and their tendency to public good. It may be added, that
as persons without any conviction from reason of the desirableness of life,
would yet of course preserve it merely from the appetite of hunger; so, by
acting merely from regard (suppose) to reputation, without any consideration of
the good of others, men often contribute to public good. In both these instances
they are plainly instruments in the hands of another, in the hands of
Providence, to carry on ends, the preservation of the individual and good of
society, which they themselves have not in their view or intention. The sum is,
Men have various appetites, passions, and particular affections, quite distinct
both from self-love and from benevolence; all of these have a tendency to
promote both public and private good, and may be considered as respecting others
and ourselves equally and in common; but some of them seem most immediately to
respect others, or tend to public good; others of them most immediately to
respect self, or tend to private good. As the former are not benevolence, so the
latter are not self-love: neither sort are instances of our love either to
ourselves or others, but only instances of our Maker's care and love both of the
individual and the species, and proofs that he intended we should be instruments of good to each other, as
well as that we should be so to ourselves.
Thirdly,
There is a principle of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between,
approve, and disapprove their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort
of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a view of what
passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, passions, affections, as
respecting such objects, and in such degrees, and of the several actions
consequent thereupon. In this survey it approves of one, glaring a disapproves
of another, and towards a third is affected neither of these ways, but is quite
indifferent. This principle in man, by which he approves or disapproves his
heart, temper, and action, is conscience; for this is the strict sense of the
word, though sometimes it is used so as to take in more. And that this faculty
tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and leads them to do
good, is too manifest to need being insisted upon. Thus, a parent has the afiection of love
to his children: this leads him to take care of, to educate, to make due
provision for them. The natural affection leads to this; but the reflection that
it is his proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right and commendable
so to do; this, added to the affection, becomes a much more settled principle,
and carries him on through more labor and difficulties for the sake of his
children, than he would undergo from that affection alone, if he thought it, and
the course of action it led to, either indifferent or criminal. This indeed is impossible, to do that
which is good, and not to approve of it; for which reason they are frequently
not considered as distinct, though they really are: for men often approve of the
actions of others, which they will not imitate, and likewise do that which they
approve not. It cannot possibly be denied, that there is this principle of
reflection or conscience in human nature. Suppose a man to relieve an innocent
person in distress; suppose the same man afterwards, in the fury of anger, to do
the greatest mischief to a person who had given no just cause of offence; to
aggravate the injury, add the circumstances of former friendship, and obligation
from the injured person; let the man who is supposed to have done these two
different actions, coolly reflect upon them afterwards, without regard to their
consequences to himself ; - to assert that any common man would be affected in
the same way towards these different actions, that he would make no distinction
between them, but approve or disapprove them equally, is too glaring a falsity
to need being confuted. There is therefore this principle of reflection or
conscience in mankind. It is needless to compare the respect it has to private
good, with the respect it has to public; since it plainly tends as much to the
latter as to the former, and is commonly thought to tend chiefly to the latter.
This faculty is now mentioned merely as another part in the inward frame of man,
pointing out to us in some degree what we are intended for, and as what will
naturally and of course have some
influence. The particular place assigned to it by nature, what authority it has,
and how great influence it ought to have, shall be hereafter
considered.
From
this comparison of benevolence and self-love, our public and private affections,
of the courses of life they lead to, and of the principle of reflection or
conscience as respecting each of them, it is as manifest, that we were made
for society, and to promote the happiness of it; as that we were intended to
take care of our own life, and health, and private
good.
And from this whole review must be given a different drought of human
nature from what we are often presented with. Mankind are by nature so closely
united, there is such a correspondence between the inward sensations of one man
and those of another, that disgrace is as much avoided as bodily pain, and to be
the object of esteem and love as much desired as any external goods: and, in
many particular cases, persons are carried on to do good to others, as the end
their affections tend to, and rest in; and manifest that they find real
satisfaction and enjoyment in this course of behaviour. There is such a natural
principle of attraction in man towards man, that having trod the same track of
land, having breathed in the same climate, barely having been born in the same
artificial district, or division, becomes the occasion of contracting
acquaintances and familiarities many years after: for any thing may serve the
purpose. Thus, relations, merely nominal, are sought and invented, not by
governors, but by the lowest of the people; which are found sufficient to hold
mankind together in little fraternities and copartnerships: weak ties indeed,
and what may afford fund enough for ridicule, if they are absurdly considered as
the real principles of that union; but they are, in truth, merely the occasions,
as any thing may be of any thing, upon which our nature carries us on according
to its own previous bent and bias; which occasions, therefore, would be nothing
at all, were there not this prior disposition and bias of nature. Men are so
much one body, that in a peculiar manner they feel for each other, shame, sudden
danger, resentment, honor, prosperity, distress: one or another, or all of
these, from the social nature in general, from benevolence, upon the occasion of
natural relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence; each of these being
distinct cements of society. And, therefore, to have no restraint from, no
regard to others in our behaviour, is the speculative absurdity of considering
ourselves as single and independent, as having nothing in our nature which has
respect to our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice. And this is the
same absurdity, as to suppose a hand, or any part, to have no natural respect to
any other, or to the whole body.
But
allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man dispositions and principles
within, which lead him to do evil to others, as well as to do good? whence come
the many miseries else, which men are the authors and instruments of to each
other?" These questions, as far as
they relate to the foregoing discourse, may be answered by asking, "Has not man
also dispositions and principles within, which lead him to do evil to himself,
as well as good? whence come the many miseries else, sickness, pain, and death,
which men are the instruments and authors of to
themselves?"
It
may be thought more easy to answer one of these questions than the other, but
the answer to both is really the same: That mankind have ungoverned passions
which they will gratify at any rate, as well to the injury of others, as in
contradiction to known private interest: But that as there is no such thing as
self-hatred, so neither is there any such thing as ill-will in one man towards
another, emulation and resentment being away; whereas there is plainly
benevolence or good-will. There is no such thing as love of injustice,
oppression, treachery, ingratitude; but only eager desires after such and such
external goods; which, according to a very ancient observation, the most
abandoned would choose to obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy, and as
effectual to their end. That even emulation and resentment, by anyone who will
consider what these passions really are in nature (5),
will be found nothing to the purpose of this objection; and that the principles
and passions in the mind of man which are distinct both from self-love and
benevolence, primarily and most directly lead to right behaviour with regard to
others as well as himself, and only secondarily and accidentally to what is
evil. Thus, though men, to avoid the shame of one villany, are sometimes guilty
of a greater; yet it is easy to see, that the original tendency of shame is to
prevent the doing of shameful actions; and its leading men to conceal such that
actions when done, is only in consequence of their being done; i. e. of
the passion's not having answered its first end.
If
it be said, that there are persons in the world, who are, in great measure,
without the natural affections towards their fellow-creatures; there are
likewise instances of persons without the common natural affections to
themselves: but the nature of man is not to be judged by either of these, but by
what appears in the common world, in the bulk of mankind.
I
am afraid it would be thought very strange, if, to confirm the truth of this
account of human nature, and make out the justness of the foregoing comparison,
it should be added, that from what appears, men, in fact, as much and as often
contradict that part of their nature which respects self; and which leads
them to their own private good and happiness, as they contradict that
part of it which respects society, and tends to public good: That
there are as few persons, who attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment
which they might attain in the present world, as who do the greatest good to
others which they might do; nay, that there are as few who can be said really
and in earnest to aim at one, as at the other. Take a survey of mankind: The
world in general, the good and bad, almost without exception, equally are
agreed, that were religion out of the case, the happiness of the present life
would consist in a manner wholly in riches, honors, sensual gratifications;
insomuch that one scarce hears a reflection made upon prudence, life, conduct,
but upon this supposition. Yet, on the contrary, that persons in the greatest
affluence of fortune are no happier than such as have only a competency; that
the cares and disappointments of ambition for the most part far exceed the
satisfactions of it; as also the miserable intervals of intemperance and excess,
and the many untimely deaths occasioned by a dissolute course of life: these
things are all seen, acknowledged, by every one acknowledged; but are thought no
objections against, though they expressly contradict this universal principle,
that the happiness of the present life consists in one or other of them. Whence
is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is not the middle way obvious? Can any
thing be more manifest, than that the happiness of life consists in these,
possessed and enjoyed only to a certain degree; that to pursue them beyond this
degree, is always attended with more inconvenience than advantage to a
man's-self, and often with extreme misery he greatest and unhappiness? Whence
then, I say, is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is it really the result of
consideration in mankind, how they may become most easy to themselves, most free
from care, and enjoy the chief happiness attainable in this world? or is it not
manifestly owing either to this, that they have not cool and reasonable concern
enough for themselves to consider wherein their chief happiness in the present
life consists; or else, if they do consider it, that they will not act
conformably to what is the result of that consideration? i. e. reasonable
concern for themselves, or cool self-love, is prevailed over by passion and
appetite. So that, from what appears, there is no ground to assert, that those
principles in the nature of man, which most directly lead to promote the good
our fellow creatures, are more generally or in a greater degree violated, than
those which most directly lead us to promote our own private good and
happiness.
The
sum of the whole is plainly this. The nature of man, considered in his single
capacity, and with respect only to the present world, is adapted and leads him
attain the greatest happiness he can for himself in the present world. The
nature of man, considered in public or social capacity, leads him to a right
behavior in society, to that course of life which we call virtue. Men follow or obey their nature in both
these capacities and respects to a certain degree, but not entirely; their
actions do not come up to the whole of what their nature leads them to in either
of these capacities or respects; and they often violate their nature in both;
i. e. as they neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-creatures, to
which their nature is abhorrent: so there is a manifest negligence in men of
their real happiness or interest in the present world, when that interest is
inconsistent with a present gratification; for the sake of which they
negligently, nay, even knowingly, are the authors and instruments of their own
misery and ruin. Thus they are as often unjust to themselves as to others, and
for the most part are equally so to both by the same actions.
1 1 Cor. xii.
2 Suppose a man of learning to be
writing a grave book upon human nature and to show in several parts of it
that he had an insight into the subject he was considering; amongst other
things, the following one would require to be accounted for; the appearance
of benevolence or good will in men
towards each other in the instances of natural relation, and in other.
†
Cautious of being deceived with outward show, he retires within himself, to see
exactly what that is in the mind of man from whence this appearance proceeds;
and upon deep reflection, asserts the principle in the mind to be only the love
of power, and delight in the exercise of it. Would not every body think here was
a mistake of one word for another ? That the philosopher was contemplating and
accounting for some other human actions, some other behaviour of man to
man? And could anyone be thoroughly satisfied, that what is commonly called
benevolence or good will was really the affection meant, but only by being made
to understand that this learned person had a general hypothesis, to which the
appearance of good will could no otherwise be reconciled? That what has this
appearance, is often nothing but ambition; that a delight in superiority often
(suppose always) mixes itself with benevolence, only makes it more specious to
call it ambition than hunger, of the two; but in reality that passion does no
more account for the whole appearances of good will than this appetite does. Is
there not often the appearance of one man's wishing that good to another, which
he knows himself unable to procure him; and rejoicing in it, though bestowed by
a third person? And can love of power any way possibly come in to account for
this desire or delight? Is there not often the appearance of men's
distinguishing between two or more persons, preferring one before another, to do
good to, in cases where love of power cannot in the least account for the
distinction and preference? For this principle can no otherwise distinguish
between objects, than as it is a greater instance and exertion of power to do
good to one rather than to another. Again, suppose good will in the mind of man
to be nothing but delight in the exercise of power: men might indeed be
restrained by distant and accidental considerations; but these restraints being
removed, they would have a, a disposition to, and delight in mischief, as an
exercise and proof of a power: and this disposition and delight would arise
from, or be the same principle in the mind, as a disposition to, and delight in
charity. Thus cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment, would be exactly
the same in the mind of man as good will: that one tends to the happiness, the
other to the misery of our fellow creatures, is, it seems, merely an accidental
circumstance, which the mind has not the least regard to. These are the
absurdities which even men of capacity run into, when they have occasion to
belie their nature, and will perversely disclaim that image of God which was
originally stamped upon it: the traces of which, however faint, are plainly
discernible upon the mind of man.
If
any person can in earnest doubt, whether there be such a thing as good will in
one man towards another; (for the question is not concerning either the degree
or extensiveness of it, but concerning the affection itself;) let it be
observed, that whether man be thus, or otherwise constituted, what is the
inward frame in this particular, is a mere question of fact or natural
history, not proveable immediately by reason. It is therefore to be judged of
and determined in the same way other facts or matters of natural history are: by
appealing to the external senses, or inward perceptions, respectively, as the
matter under consideration is cognizable by one or the other: by arguing from
acknowledged facts and actions; for a great les number of actions of the same
kind, in different circumstances, and on respecting different objects, will
prove, to a certainty, what principles they do not, and, to the greatest
probability, what principles they do proceed from: and, lastly, by the testimony
of mankind. Now, that there is some degree of benevolence amongst men, may be as
of strongly and plainly proved in all these ways, as it could possibly be
proved, supposing there was this affection in our nature. And should any one
think fit to assert, that resentment in the mind of man was of absolutely
nothing but reasonable concern for our own safety, the falsity of this, and what
is the real nature of that passion, could be shown in no other ways than those
in which it may be shown, that there is such a thing in some degree as
real good will in man towards man. It is sufficient that the seeds of it be
implanted in our it nature by God. There is, it is owned, much left for us to do
upon our own heart and temper; to cultivate, to improve, to call it forth, to
exercise it in a steady uniform manner. This is our work: this is virtue and
religion.
†
Hobbs of Human Nature, c. 9.§ 17.
3 Every body makes a distinction
between self-love, and the several particular passions, appetites, and
affections; and yet they are often confounded again. That they are totally
different, will be seen by anyone who will distinguish between the passions and
appetites themselves, and endeavoring after the means of their gratification.
Consider the appetite of hunger, and the desire of esteem; these being the
occasion both of pleasure and pain, the coolest self-love, as well as the
appetites and passions themselves, may put us upon making use of the proper
methods of obtaining that pleasure, and avoiding that pain; but the
feelings themselves, the pain of hunger and shame, and the delight from
esteem, are no more self-love than they are any thing in the world. Though a man
hated himself, he would as much feel the pain of hunger as he would that of the
gout: and it is plainly supposable, there may be creatures with self-love in
them to the highest degree, who may be quite insensible and indifferent (as men
in some cases are) to the contempt and esteem of those upon whom their happiness
does not in some further respects depend. And as self-love and the several
particular passions and appetites are in themselves totally different; so that
some actions proceed from one, and some from the other, will be manifest to any
who will observe the two following very supposable cases. - One man rushes upon
certain ruin for the gratification of a present desire; nobody will call the
principle of this action self-love. Suppose another man to go through some
laborious work, upon promise of a great reward, without any distinct knowledge
what the reward will be; this course of action cannot be ascribed to any
particular passion. The former of these actions is plainly to be imputed to some
particular passion or affection, the latter as plainly to the general affection
or principle of self-love. That there are some particular pursuits or actions
concerning which we cannot determine how far they are owing to one, and how far
to the other, proceeds from this, that the two principles are frequently mixed
together, and run into each other. This distinction is further explained in the
eleventh sermon.
4
If any desire to see this
distinction and comparison made in a particular instance, the appetite and
passion now mentioned may reward serve for one. Hunger is to be considered as a
private appetite; because the end for which it was given us, is the preservation
of the former individual. Desire of esteem is a public passion; because the end
for which it was given us is to regulate our behaviour towards society. The
respect which this has to private good is as remote, as the respect that has to
public good; and the appetite is no more self-love, than the passion is
benevolence. The object and end of the former is merely food; the object and end
of the latter is merely esteem: but the latter can no more be gratified, without
contributing to the good of society, than the former can be gratified, without
contributing to the preservation of the individual.
5 Emulation is merely the desire and
hope of equality with, or superiority over others, with whom we compare
ourselves, There does not appear to be any other grief in the natural
passion, but only that want which is implied in desire, However, this may
be so strong as to be the occasion of great grief. To desire the attainment of
this equality, or superiority, by the particular means of others being brought
down to our own level, or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy.
From whence it is easy to see, that the real end which the natural passion,
emulation, and which the unlawful one, envy, aims at, is exactly the same;
namely that equality or superiority; and, consequently, that to do mischief is
not the end of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end. As
to resentment, see the eighth sermon.